September 7, 2015

September 7, 2015

Written by Maximus Peperkamp, M.S. Verbal Engineer

Dear Reader, 

The following writing is my second response to “Some Relations Between Culture, Ethics and Technology in B.F. Skinner” by Melo, Castro & de Rose (2015). With the dialogue between Castle and Frazier in Walden Two, Skinner emphasizes that “behavior analysts have mastered a technology of behavior and not using it would be negligent, because power to do that would be delegated to others (Skinner, 1953/1965).” He was more aware of the immense importance of verbal behavior then other behaviorists. His speech contained more SVB than others who continued to speak coercively, even while proclaiming to be against it. Skinner has only been successful in correcting the content of speech by his novel descriptions of behavior, but, as the discussion between Castle and Frazier shows, he wasn’t able to address, let alone correct, how we are speaking with each other. 

The so-called difference of opinion between the characters Castle and Frazier in Walden II is only one aspect of what actually happens in their conversation. Castle, who wants to “throw the science of behavior in the ocean” is clearly producing NVB, while Frazier, who is in favor of “giving all the help” he could give by implementation of behavioral technology, speaks from a positive, that is, from a SVB perspective. In other words, Castle induces negative affect, while Frazier, induces positive affect. 

I agree that not applying the behavioral technology to how we speak “would be negligent.” As “the power to do that would be delegated to others”, behaviorists have let their own NVB get in the way of implementing behavioral technology. SVB must be a priority if implementation of behavioral technology is the goal, but SVB has yet to be mastered by the majority of behaviorists. It is a big mistake to think that the dialogues between Frazier and Castle “summarize the debate between advocates of a behavioral technology and its critics, particularly those concerned with political, philosophical, and ethical issues.” Skinner, who ‘later dedicated a whole book to address these issues, in his 1971 essay Beyond Freedom and Dignity ( Skinner, 1971/2002)”, was too busy with what he was saying to get more specifically involved with how he was saying what he was saying. However, the sound of his voice, was unique as it expressed mainly SVB.

“Cultural interventions based on a technology of behavior require decisions about what is better for the people, for the culture.” NVB is not better for the people or for the culture, only SVB is. The science of SVB can tell us what these criteria are, but this science has yet to be acknowledged and learned. The authors worry, but, like many other behaviorists, they have not taken note of the SVB/NVB distinction. “If it tells us, does it not put itself at risk of losing its scientific status, becoming prescriptive rather than descriptive? How does Radical Behaviorism deal with questions about what is good, what is better for people and their culture? These are questions about values, about what is better and what should be done.” If we had SVB dialogue these question would never arise. These questions arose from NVB, which is characterized by separation and anxiety.  

The search for “Radical behavioristic ethics that could establish values to guide large-scale interventions on human behavior such as the design of a culture”, took didn't bring us any closer to the SVB/NVB distinction. The grand illusion that “such ethics” could “determine objectives for a cultural intervention” is a byproduct of NVB. The only way in which behavioral technology can achieve the goals which are only possible due to the implementation of this behavioral technology, is by embracing SVB as the technology that will help implement other behavioral technologies. The authors try to distill some “Skinnerian ethics” by focusing on “educational technology because survival of the culture seems to require an educational technology that teaches individuals to think, solve problems, be creative, and free themselves from certain kinds of environmental control.” 

Presumably, talking and listening isn’t enough. Although behaviorists have mastered the technology of behavior, they have not mastered the technology of SVB. As long as they continue to produce biased and pre-scientific NVB, they neglect the power of behavioral technology and undermine themselves. Radical behaviorist ethics have not and could not be realized as long as the  SVB/NVB distinction wasn’t clear. “Survival of the culture” requires a talking technology rather than an educational technology. Individuals don’t need a technology that “makes them think, be creative, solve problems, and free themselves from certain kinds of environmental control.” They need a technology which makes it easier and more likely that they talk. Of course, this talking will only be beneficial to them and to others if it is not the kind of talking we are used to and conditioned by, that is, NVB. The talking which is directly needed is SVB, as it only occurs in absence of NVB.

I wholeheartedly agree with Proudfoot and Lacey (2010) that “there is a distinction between talking about ethics and talking ethically, between views of ethics and views in ethics.” However, I would phrase it like this: either we talk and we really mean what we say or we don’t. In SVB we mean what we say, but in NVB we pretend to be talking, while in reality we are dominating, manipulating, intimidating, forcing and upsetting each other. According to the authors, there is “a controversial philosophical issue that must be faced: the fact-value distinction.” They raise the question if  there is “an ontological difference between statements of facts and statements of value?” Such question only arises from NVB, in which this separation is made. During SVB no separation is made between "statements of facts and statements of value" and the question never even arises. This  “controversial philosophical issue” is maintained by a way of talking in which the speaker coerces the listener with a negative contingency.

“Leigland (2005) argued that Skinner does not recognize an ontological

distinction between statements of facts and statements of values”, but what he doesn’t and couldn't mention is that this statement is based on Skinner’s SVB. It is only in SVB that congruence between facts and values can occur. In NVB, by contrast, the facts speak a different story than a person’s values. Thus, NVB speakers are always hypocrites and constantly contradicting themselves even though it is not their conscious choice to be this way. They don’t themselves cause this way of talking, but, due to their conditioning, they are repeatedly in environments which make them talk that way. 

Skinner, due to his development and knowledge about radical behaviorism, was able to create and maintain environments in which he could function optimally. This also affected the way in which he spoke. Skinner was never forceful in his speech. In NVB a person’s values presumably are separate from his actions. That is why a famous football player, who brutally beat up his girlfriend, got away with a lame excuse by saying that he acted against his own values. Skinner, however, urges us to treat “values as behavioral phenomena, analyzed, like other behavioral phenomena, as the interaction between organism and environment. In this sense, there is no dichotomy between facts and values. Values belong to the factual world.” To talk about facts and values in this way will automatically result into SVB.

According to the authors, Skinner’s ethics is descriptive as his work mainly dealt with the field of investigation. However, “Parallel to meta-ethics, there is another meaning for ethics: prescriptive ethics, which is normative, at times known as morals, involving predominantly imperative propositions. On the basis of these definitions, meta-ethics may be understood as the study of morals.” These authors, like many others (Skinner included), write that they say something, when in fact they are only writing something, which is only read by the reader. They write and the reader reads “We can say that Skinner’s ethics presents itself in these two senses. However, whereas his meta-ethics is explicit, the moral component of his ethics is implicit, not recognized as such by himself, and this introduces a degree of tension in his texts.” Skinner’s “meta-ethics is explicit” as it was written. The moral, implicit components of his ethics, which was apparent in how he talked “introduces a degree of tension in his texts” because he didn’t yet analyze his own vocal verbal behavior in terms of SVB and NVB.