September 9, 2015

September 9, 2015

Written by Maximus Peperkamp, M.S. Verbal Engineer

Dear Reader,

The following writing is my fourth response to “Some Relations Between Culture, Ethics and Technology in B.F. Skinner” by Melo, Castro & de Rose (2015). The authors state “This science seeks to explain why each individual advocates for, claims to possess, or has the behavior governed by certain values.” How do individuals do this? They do this by talking with each other! When behaviorist, in their effort to explain and predict behavior, write about this or read about what others have written about this, they are not talking about it.  These authors write “We call these events “good”. Therefore we say that some values have phylogenic origin”, but the fact is, they haven’t said anything. Skinner was also writing about speaking, but his speaking was different from other behaviorists. His public speech became over time more and more guided by a very refined private speech and that is how he was able to practice self-management and do his discoveries.

I say this to introduce the reader to Sound Verbal Behavior (SVB) in which public speech includes and is guided by private speech. Let there be no mistake, private speech is, of course, a function of public speech. Therefore, the kind of private speech one acquires depends on the kind of public speech one was exposed to. It seems to me that Skinner had a lot of positive self-talk, which derived from high levels of SVB he was exposed to while growing up. Since his view of the world was shaped by these positive emotions, he was capable of maintaining and prolonging his positive experiences with his own behavior. This was particularly apparent in the way he spoke and sounded. His speech was entirely under control of radical behaviorism. This cannot be said about most of the other behaviorists. Many learned about operant conditioning by reading and studying his work, but few were able to interact with him. And, those who did cared more about what he said then how he said it.

Skinner cared deeply about what he said as well as how he said it. He had in his younger years wanted to become a writer, but his private speech guided him towards a scientific career, which was simply more reinforcing to him. His behavior was under control of “the good of others” in that he wanted to improve the world. His whole science consists of contingencies which “are established to generate behavior under control of what is reinforcing to others.” Naturally, what is “good for others” was also good for him personally. The connection between the “the personal good” and “the good for others” brought into view “the good for the culture.” How can something be good for the culture if it is not good for the person? How can something be good for others if it is not good for the individual? Of course, these values are related and must be embedded into each other to have any meaning.

“Skinner points out that feelings associated with ethical behavior do not cause the behavior. “Stimuli are reinforcing and produce conditions which are felt as good for a single reason, to be found in an evolutionary history. Even as a clue, the important thing is not the feeling, but the thing felt (Skinner, 1971/2002, p. 107).”” Only this rootedness in evolutionary history can explain the complexity and congruence of our behavior. I like to remind the reader here that “the thing felt” while we speak is how we sound. It is the sound of the speaker’s voice which induces positive or negative emotions in the listener. In Noxious Verbal Behavior (NVB) we get carried away by feelings, because we don’t pay attention to “the thing felt”, in other words, to how the speaker sounds.  We take it personal when our feelings get hurt, but this always happens when someone sounds threatening, intimidating and aggressive to us. 

During most of Skinner’s speech there is no aversive stimulation at all and what he is saying is easy to understand. Skinner is aware of the power that is involved in the control of reinforcers. He disagrees with those who have this power and who use it in a way that only benefits themselves. His science, like SVB, has the potential to change all of that. “Governments, religions, and capitalistic systems, whether public or private, control most of reinforcers of daily life, they must use them, as they have always done, for their own aggrandizement, and they have nothing to gain by relinquishing power.”  His science opens the door to a whole new way of life, but this will not be possible as long as our way of talking, which is mainly NVB, maintains this power structure. “Other social contingencies may lead us to act for the good of the culture as a whole and not just for the good of an “other,” or an “other” organized as a controlling agency (Skinner, 1971/2002).” Skinner refers to SVB, in which the speaker induces and maintains a positive affective connected experience with the listener. SVB involves “other social contingencies,” but NVB doesn’t and can’t. However, SVB doesn’t involve “the “other” as an organized group, as the controlling agencies.” SVB is only possible when the speaker and the listener are one within the speaker as the speaker listens to him or herself while he or she speaks. When we listen to ourselves while we speak, the separation between the speaker and the listener (outside of the skin of the speaker) dissolves, because the speaker reinforces the listener and the listener reinforces the speaker.

“An important feature of Skinner’s meta-ethics is moral relativism. There is no absolute good or evil. Events acquire functions and classifications for an individual as a result of her/his phylogenic repertoire and of contingencies to which she/he is submitted along ontogenesis, particularly social contingencies.” This moral relativism is not specific to Skinner’s work. It pertains to all scientific behavior. SVB is a manner of speaking which is in synch with what we scientifically know. It works as it is the same for everyone who experiences and engages in it. This means that when the contingencies are such that it is possible, it will happen, like water evaporating at 100 degrees Celsius. The lawfulness of SVB and NVB will not be apparent as long as we remain stuck with our false belief in good and evil. It is for this very reason that we haven’t accepted the SVB/NVB distinction and keep going circles when it comes to how human beings actually interact.   

September 8, 2015

September 8, 2015

Written by Maximus Peperkamp, M.S. Verbal Engineer

Dear Reader,

The following writing is my third response to “Some Relations Between Culture, Ethics and Technology in B.F. Skinner” by Melo, Castro & de Rose (2015). Since the authors don’t know about the Sound Verbal Behavior/Noxious Verbal Behavior distinction, they split Skinner’s ethics into meta-ethics and moral ethics. The split between facts and values, common to those who are still uninformed about behaviorism, is now replaced by meta-ethics and moral-ethics. These authors correctly feel that Skinner left out moral ethics as he didn’t write about the vocal verbal behavior which must be practiced to accurately talk about behaviorism. That vocal verbal behavior must be SVB. Although it has not been analyzed in this way, it was because of SVB that Skinner did “not recognize an ontological distinction between statements of facts and statements of values.” Anyone with SVB would know that.  

The authors wonder: “Could we, then, refer to a radical behaviorist meta-ethics as an empirical ethics? We think so. What is a value, what is good or what benefits an individual or a group of individuals, have this status because of phylogenic, ontogenetic, and cultural histories.” Their initial question comes from NVB in which we don’t connect with what we say. SVB makes us talk about each of these three levels of analysis, but NVB prevents such talk. Since there are no arguments in SVB, it is literally beyond dispute that SVB has to be the language of empirical ethics. NVB is still so common among scientists as they are not scientific about talking. During NVB even behaviorists stop being behaviorists, they become pre-scientific and superstitious.   

To Skinner the above question never arose. He wrote “What a given group of people calls good is a fact: it is what members of the group find reinforcing as the result of their genetic endowment and the natural and social contingencies to which they have been exposed” (Skinner, 1971/2002, p. 128, emphasis added). Then, “things are good (positively reinforcing) or bad (negatively reinforcing)” (Skinner, 1971/2002, p. 104) and “good things are positive reinforcers” (Skinner, 1971/2002, p. 103), “what is good for the individual is what promotes his well-being” (Skinner, 1974/1976, p. 226).” Skinner is very clear on the fact that what is considered good by one given group of people may be considered bad by another group of people. Without acknowledging this, we are always trying to convince others that what we find good is better than what they find good. This would be an example of NVB. Acknowledging our different behavioral histories is needed to pave the way for SVB.  Skinner’s radical behaviorism paves the way for SVB. The tone of his voice and the calmness of his speech signify his SVB.  

“Skinner draws a parallel to the phylogenic and cultural levels: “What is good for the species is what make for its survival....What is good for a culture is what permits it to solve its problems” (Skinner, 1974/1976, p. 226). In this sense, what has value for a culture is what contributes to its survival.” NVB doesn’t permit us to solve our problems. SVB, on the other hand, facilitates the much-needed cross-cultural dialogue.  With SVB, we will survive, as we can salvage the best of each culture. With NVB, however, we will demonize each other’s cultural heritage. 

“Skinner distinguishes three kinds of “good.”” He recognizes “personal good, owing to our biological susceptibility and genetic endowment; the good of others, derived from social reinforcement for positive social behavior; and the good of the culture, and the measures the culture uses to induce its members to work for its survival.” The personal good, the good of others and the good of the culture are all included and intertwined in SVB, but in NVB the personal good is more important than the good of others or the good of the culture. Different “goods” “all refer to consequences, but may be distinguished by who is mostly affected by the consequences.” In NVB the good of others and the good of culture are used as arguments to cover up that consequences are for the personal good. “People can act under control of personal goods, the good of others and the good of the culture”, but whenever their actions are based on the consequences of only one or two of these, they have NVB. Thus, SVB creates universal positive consequences.

It is often said that everything has already been said, but nothing is further away from the truth. We have had SVB in such limited amounts that most of us have never experienced ongoing SVB. The conversation about SVB has yet to get started. As long as behaviorists were mainly involved in reading and writing, it couldn’t get started. Talking which is simultaneously under control of “personal goods, the good of others and the good of culture” is a new phenomenon, introduced by Skinner.  

The authors quote Skinner who wrote: “When we say that a value judgment is a matter not of fact but of how someone feels about a fact, we are simply distinguishing between a thing and its reinforcing effects. Things themselves are studied by physics and biology, usually without reference to their value, but the reinforcing effects of things are the province of behavioral science, which, to the extent that it is concerned with operant reinforcement, is a science of values. (Skinner, 1971/2002, p. 104, emphasis added).” If I were to add emphasis, I would underline the fact that we say these things. Skinner said these things in a different manner than most behaviorists are saying it. Moreover, Skinner’s way of saying things was inextricably connected to his writings, but this is not the case with most other behaviorists. The majority of behaviorists superstitiously believe that they are saying something, while in fact they are only writing about it. They imagine to be part of a conversation while in fact they are  only reading about it. Stated differently, the importance of talking about it is lost due to an emphasis on writing about “operant reinforcement” as “a science of values.” Verbal behavior as behavior that is mediated by others, can only be felt while we talk about how we feel about the facts as we perceive them.

September 7, 2015

September 7, 2015

Written by Maximus Peperkamp, M.S. Verbal Engineer

Dear Reader, 

The following writing is my second response to “Some Relations Between Culture, Ethics and Technology in B.F. Skinner” by Melo, Castro & de Rose (2015). With the dialogue between Castle and Frazier in Walden Two, Skinner emphasizes that “behavior analysts have mastered a technology of behavior and not using it would be negligent, because power to do that would be delegated to others (Skinner, 1953/1965).” He was more aware of the immense importance of verbal behavior then other behaviorists. His speech contained more SVB than others who continued to speak coercively, even while proclaiming to be against it. Skinner has only been successful in correcting the content of speech by his novel descriptions of behavior, but, as the discussion between Castle and Frazier shows, he wasn’t able to address, let alone correct, how we are speaking with each other. 

The so-called difference of opinion between the characters Castle and Frazier in Walden II is only one aspect of what actually happens in their conversation. Castle, who wants to “throw the science of behavior in the ocean” is clearly producing NVB, while Frazier, who is in favor of “giving all the help” he could give by implementation of behavioral technology, speaks from a positive, that is, from a SVB perspective. In other words, Castle induces negative affect, while Frazier, induces positive affect. 

I agree that not applying the behavioral technology to how we speak “would be negligent.” As “the power to do that would be delegated to others”, behaviorists have let their own NVB get in the way of implementing behavioral technology. SVB must be a priority if implementation of behavioral technology is the goal, but SVB has yet to be mastered by the majority of behaviorists. It is a big mistake to think that the dialogues between Frazier and Castle “summarize the debate between advocates of a behavioral technology and its critics, particularly those concerned with political, philosophical, and ethical issues.” Skinner, who ‘later dedicated a whole book to address these issues, in his 1971 essay Beyond Freedom and Dignity ( Skinner, 1971/2002)”, was too busy with what he was saying to get more specifically involved with how he was saying what he was saying. However, the sound of his voice, was unique as it expressed mainly SVB.

“Cultural interventions based on a technology of behavior require decisions about what is better for the people, for the culture.” NVB is not better for the people or for the culture, only SVB is. The science of SVB can tell us what these criteria are, but this science has yet to be acknowledged and learned. The authors worry, but, like many other behaviorists, they have not taken note of the SVB/NVB distinction. “If it tells us, does it not put itself at risk of losing its scientific status, becoming prescriptive rather than descriptive? How does Radical Behaviorism deal with questions about what is good, what is better for people and their culture? These are questions about values, about what is better and what should be done.” If we had SVB dialogue these question would never arise. These questions arose from NVB, which is characterized by separation and anxiety.  

The search for “Radical behavioristic ethics that could establish values to guide large-scale interventions on human behavior such as the design of a culture”, took didn't bring us any closer to the SVB/NVB distinction. The grand illusion that “such ethics” could “determine objectives for a cultural intervention” is a byproduct of NVB. The only way in which behavioral technology can achieve the goals which are only possible due to the implementation of this behavioral technology, is by embracing SVB as the technology that will help implement other behavioral technologies. The authors try to distill some “Skinnerian ethics” by focusing on “educational technology because survival of the culture seems to require an educational technology that teaches individuals to think, solve problems, be creative, and free themselves from certain kinds of environmental control.” 

Presumably, talking and listening isn’t enough. Although behaviorists have mastered the technology of behavior, they have not mastered the technology of SVB. As long as they continue to produce biased and pre-scientific NVB, they neglect the power of behavioral technology and undermine themselves. Radical behaviorist ethics have not and could not be realized as long as the  SVB/NVB distinction wasn’t clear. “Survival of the culture” requires a talking technology rather than an educational technology. Individuals don’t need a technology that “makes them think, be creative, solve problems, and free themselves from certain kinds of environmental control.” They need a technology which makes it easier and more likely that they talk. Of course, this talking will only be beneficial to them and to others if it is not the kind of talking we are used to and conditioned by, that is, NVB. The talking which is directly needed is SVB, as it only occurs in absence of NVB.

I wholeheartedly agree with Proudfoot and Lacey (2010) that “there is a distinction between talking about ethics and talking ethically, between views of ethics and views in ethics.” However, I would phrase it like this: either we talk and we really mean what we say or we don’t. In SVB we mean what we say, but in NVB we pretend to be talking, while in reality we are dominating, manipulating, intimidating, forcing and upsetting each other. According to the authors, there is “a controversial philosophical issue that must be faced: the fact-value distinction.” They raise the question if  there is “an ontological difference between statements of facts and statements of value?” Such question only arises from NVB, in which this separation is made. During SVB no separation is made between "statements of facts and statements of value" and the question never even arises. This  “controversial philosophical issue” is maintained by a way of talking in which the speaker coerces the listener with a negative contingency.

“Leigland (2005) argued that Skinner does not recognize an ontological

distinction between statements of facts and statements of values”, but what he doesn’t and couldn't mention is that this statement is based on Skinner’s SVB. It is only in SVB that congruence between facts and values can occur. In NVB, by contrast, the facts speak a different story than a person’s values. Thus, NVB speakers are always hypocrites and constantly contradicting themselves even though it is not their conscious choice to be this way. They don’t themselves cause this way of talking, but, due to their conditioning, they are repeatedly in environments which make them talk that way. 

Skinner, due to his development and knowledge about radical behaviorism, was able to create and maintain environments in which he could function optimally. This also affected the way in which he spoke. Skinner was never forceful in his speech. In NVB a person’s values presumably are separate from his actions. That is why a famous football player, who brutally beat up his girlfriend, got away with a lame excuse by saying that he acted against his own values. Skinner, however, urges us to treat “values as behavioral phenomena, analyzed, like other behavioral phenomena, as the interaction between organism and environment. In this sense, there is no dichotomy between facts and values. Values belong to the factual world.” To talk about facts and values in this way will automatically result into SVB.

According to the authors, Skinner’s ethics is descriptive as his work mainly dealt with the field of investigation. However, “Parallel to meta-ethics, there is another meaning for ethics: prescriptive ethics, which is normative, at times known as morals, involving predominantly imperative propositions. On the basis of these definitions, meta-ethics may be understood as the study of morals.” These authors, like many others (Skinner included), write that they say something, when in fact they are only writing something, which is only read by the reader. They write and the reader reads “We can say that Skinner’s ethics presents itself in these two senses. However, whereas his meta-ethics is explicit, the moral component of his ethics is implicit, not recognized as such by himself, and this introduces a degree of tension in his texts.” Skinner’s “meta-ethics is explicit” as it was written. The moral, implicit components of his ethics, which was apparent in how he talked “introduces a degree of tension in his texts” because he didn’t yet analyze his own vocal verbal behavior in terms of SVB and NVB.