December 16, 2014

December 16, 2014

Written by Maximus Peperkamp, M.S. Verbal Engineer

Dear Reader, 

The following is a response to “Rescuing The Science Of Human Behavior From The Ashes Of Socialism” (1997) by Ullin T. Place. This writer agrees that “only by reinstating the link between linguistics and animal learning can confidence be restored in the possibility of a genuine science of human behavior with application to the problem of constructing a better social order.” However, he thinks of this missing “link” as something spoken, not written. Of course, writing can lead to speaking and that is why this author is writing about this spoken link.

The “failure of socialism” and the “discrediting” of “the very idea that by applying the scientific method to the study of human social behavior it is possible to devise ways to improve human societies in a way that will benefit everyone” is caused by how people talk, communicate, interact, relate and not by “competitive capitalism” or by “obscurantist principles such as tribalism, nationalism, and religious fundamentalism.” Since Place quotes Comte (1798-1857), who already argued that “the natural sciences can and should be applied with equal diligence to the study of the more intractable phenomenon of human social behavior”, it is astounding that he still equates the “failure of the social sciences” with the “failure to develop an effective science of human behavior at the level of the individual” (italics added). However, according to this author, it is the failure to develop an effective science of human behavior at the level of the group, which has prevented scientists from achieving the “kind of theoretical consensus that has characterized physics since Newton, chemistry since Lavoisier, and biology since Darwin.” 

Naturally, human behavior at the level of the group is less likely to be explored by those with an individualistic bias. In two of his three suggestions, Place emphasizes “the failure to develop an effective science of human behavior at the individual level”, but mentioning “the experimental studies of the behavior of other species of free-moving living organisms”, he contradicts this emphasis. Ironically, in his third suggestion, he blames Noam Chomsky, an individual, for the “wide-spread”, socially-accepted claim, which “inhibited the development of human behavior based on operant principles.” Of course, the “one phenomenon which above all others distinguishes human-behavior from that of other species of living organisms”, is socially mediated language, which only makes sense at the group-level.

Place’s assessment that Skinner’s book Verbal Behavior (1957) “represented a problem” and “had to be abandoned” reflects his ambition for “academic prestige” rather than social aptness. His question, about how “novel sentences are constructed”, requires the extension of Verbal Behavior this author proposes with Sound Verbal Behavior (SVB) and Noxious Verbal Behavior (NVB). These universal categories of Verbal Behavior contribute greatly to our understanding of the “functional significance” of a “novel sentence” and “the role of the listener’s reinforcement in keeping it going and making it possible.” However, there is, in the opinion of this writer, nothing wrong with Skinner’s book, about the verbal community, which shapes speaking, listening, writing and reading behavior. The question “how to live harmoniously and constructively together, using positive reinforcement in place of aversive control?” can only be answered when our SVB begins to replace our NVB. 

SVB is a group process, but NVB is an individual process. In SVB we talk with each other, but in NVB we talk at each other. SVB is bi-directional and NVB is uni-directional. In SVB we reciprocally reinforce each other, but NVB is based on ‘my way or the high way,' in other words, in NVB the speaker coerces the listener. SVB is mostly operant, while NVB is mostly respondent behavior. The contingency which sets the stage for stability, predictability and social cohesion, gives rise to SVB, while the contingency which only perpetuates survival of the fittest produces NVB. 

The much-lamented “failure [of behaviorism] to deal adequately with the phenomenon of language” is not because “human language and cognition can and must be studied without regard to the study of animal behavior” and has nothing to do with anyone’s aversion against the word “behavior”, but is a consequence of the continuation of NVB, which can occur because patterns of group behavior, while we interact, have not yet been properly analyzed. Emphasis on the organism was necessary, but should have led to further analysis of meta-contingencies, which pertain to behavior of the group.