July 30, 2016

July 30, 2016

Written by Maximus Peperkamp, M.S. Behavioral Engineer

Dear Reader,

This writing is under control of the paper “Radical Behaviorism in Reconciliation with Phenomenology” by Willard Day (1969). Although this paper was written quite some time ago, it is worth commenting on it as I will use it to elaborate on my distinction between Sound Verbal Behavior (SVB) and Noxious Verbal Behavior (NVB). Day wrote the paper in response to the Rice Symposium at which B.F. Skinner and other psychologists spoke about Behaviorism and Phenomenology. 

One of the conclusions of this symposium is still true today “behaviorism, in the sense in which the term is widely used among psychologists, is essentially an unproductive and unrealistic framework within which to pursue psychological research.” However, the SVB/NVB distinction, my extension to Radical Behaviorism (RB), is going to change that. It is my contention RB has been mainly communicated by means of NVB. Once RB is communicated by means of SVB, it will be acknowledged that it is a productive as well as realistic “framework within which to pursue psychological research”. 

The different way of talking, which I propose, doesn’t change anything about RB. To the contrary, SVB will make clear what has until now been misunderstood and misrepresented. Koch, presumably an authority on behaviorism, spoke of “the death rattle of behaviorism.” Anyone who is considered to be an expert in behaviorism would not make such a stupid statement.  Another ignorant presenter at the Rice convention was the confused philosopher Scriven, who stated behaviorism was “the wrong philosophy.” Astounding that someone can come up with such words. 

Carl Rogers, who was also present, stated something more forward: “There is a lot about behaviorism that I accept. I was simply trying to go beyond it.” Rogers was more into SVB than most behaviorists, but he was absolutely wrong to argue that behaviorists “rule out consideration of the whole universe of inner meanings, of purposes, of the inner flow of experiencing.” He should have known that behaviorists don’t rule out such private speech, but aren’t satisfied with his agential explanatory fictions.  Although Rogers seemed to indicate SVB by advocating for “methods which are strictly operational”, neither he, Skinner nor Scriven knew anything about the SVB/NVB distinction. 

The “new phenomenological variables” Rogers was trying to talk about are how we experience our own and each other’s voice while we speak. Rogers claimed he had moved beyond behaviorism only to promote his own views. If it wasn’t for my comments on Day’s paper, I would never mention his name, because he was unscientific. In that sense I am like Skinner, who wouldn’t respond to people who said things which didn’t apply to him. Day pays attention to what people say. He even quotes an audience member, who “remarked that professor Koch did not seem “truly representative of what Skinner has to say.”” This applies to my distinction between SVB and NVB. He unknowingly referred to NVB, in which we are always compelled to distort what another person says. 

Koch, who felt that “the Skinnerian position is in some fundamental way internally inconsistent,” was “not aware of the fact that certain differences exist between conventional behaviorism and Skinner’s point of view.” Koch was having less SVB than Rogers, who was having less SVB than Skinner and Day was having more SVB than Rogers. One day we will physiologically measure the rates of SVB and NVB and may be then we will finally acknowledge these response classes really exist.

  

The second conclusion of the 1963 Rice symposium was “an increasing rapprochement  between the interests of behaviorism and phenomenology.” Not much about this coming together has been heard since. In other words, the “blunting rather than a sharpening of the contrast between behaviorism and phenomenology” was only something written, not something spoken. NVB prevented collaboration between behaviorists and phenomenologists, but SVB can still make it possible.

It came as a surprise that behaviorism and phenomenology had so much in common, that the “possibility of coexistence” had to be considered. As nothing was known about the SVB/NVB distinction, it was impossible to have constructive dialogue about this important connection, which could have helped to promote phenomenology as well as behaviorism.  

Even in 1963, of course, there were already those who had more SVB than others. “MacLeod suggested, with some diffidence, that the phenomological approach in psychology might lead in part to some kind of “sophisticated behaviorism.”” Scriven, who clearly had less SVB than MacLeod, “spoke specifically of the reconciliation of what he called defensible forms of behaviorism and phenomenology.” Even though Malcolm “was led to the conclusion “that Skinner had stated here an absolutely decisive objection to introspectionism”, it is likely he was even having less SVB than Scriven. When the speaker keeps insisting that the speaker is right, such a speaker is usually engaging in NVB. 

The fact that behavioral science is correct doesn’t make those who communicate it into SVB communicators. Skinner is never insisting that he is right, yet he is having mostly SVB. My suspicion about Malcolm’s NVB is probably true. How else can we explain that he “devoted considerable attention to giving “an account of the hardcore of logical truth contained in behaviorism.”” It is very likely that he is a fanatic, a purist, a predetermined, mechanical communicator.  Even Skinner himself dissented “from the view that coexistence is possible.” 

Skinner, more than anyone else, acknowledges how difficult it is to talk about these matters. Day, who, in my view, has even more SVB than Skinner, wrote this paper “to show that Skinner’s radical behaviorism is indeed capable of encompassing a productive phenomenology.” I claim to have more SVB than Day and that is why I can write about his paper. 

I like how Day speaks: “I shall attempt to illustrate the way in which radical behaviorism might profitably proceed to interact with problems that are often considered to be phenomenological in nature.” That sounds like SVB to me. If there will ever be a reconciliation between behaviorism and phenomenology it will depend on whether we will be able to more accurately describe the conflict which set them apart in the first place. NVB creates and maintains nothing but conflicts; in SVB there are no conflicts and thus there is no need for reconciliation.