November
11, 2015
Written by Maximus Peperkamp, M.S.
Verbal Engineer
Dear
Students,
This is my
eight response to “Effectiveness as Truth Criterion in Behavior Analysis” by
Tourinho and Neno (2003). The authors devote the last section of their paper to
“limits of the pragmatic criterion in behavior analysis”. This tells me they themselves aren’t pragmatic. They are still struggling with Skinner’s
“generic definition” which “provides for instrumental criterion in 1945.”
Skinner wrote “What matters to Robinson Crusoe is not
whether he is agreeing with himself but whether he is getting anywhere with his
control over nature” (Skinner, 1945, p. 293). Remarkably, they don’t go at all into
the fact that Crusoe was talking out loud with himself and that this was made
possible by the behavioral his history of talking with others.
Even though he was all
alone on his island, Crusoe, by talking out loud with himself, made his private
speech public. Interestingly, the authors do mention that “Skinner suggested
that, even in the absence of verbal interaction with others (and, therefore, in
the absence of public agreement), the validity of an explanation could be
checked”, but they don’t mention anything about the fact that a person’s private
speech is of course a function of that person’s public speech. Instead they
write “Whether or not it is possible to achieve agreement in the absence of
verbal interaction is a question that merits discussion, but to reject the requirement
of public observation should not mean that the coherence criterion could be
neglected.” Skinner had something in common with Crusoe and that is why he used
him as an example to explain his views. He knew the advantage of being alone and (like me)
he “checked” the “validity” of all his explanations on his own before he
revealed them to others.
Skinner
was able to practice self-management as he had a high rate of SVB in his
behavioral history. These high rates of SVB continue in the absence of others
in private speech and are automatically reinforced. Skinner didn’t need those who knew less than him, who had more
NVB and couldn’t achieve agreement with him. This is the situation anyone
with high rates of SVB finds him or herself in: one is liberated from the large
NVB crowd.
Let
there be no question about why I cherry-pick from the behaviorist literature: I
only choose what serves my purpose. Had Skinner used other heroes like Crusoe more often and had he written more books like Walden II, radical behaviorism
might have reached a broader audience. However, he didn’t experience any limitation to his
pragmatic approach and that is why he stuck with it and kept on going. His work, like mine, kept
on growing and growing during his life time. Seeing this development was his biggest joy. “It is,
indeed, an
a
posteriori conclusion
generated by theories selected according to their effect upon the scientist or
professional who is conducting the behavioral study that will promote cultural
survival.”
Only after we come back again to SVB can we realize we were involved in NVB. NVB
goes on so often, but we remain unaware of it. Only when NVB was stopped can we
explore and reap the benefits of SVB. Certainly, this doesn’t happen often, but that is our problem. It could happen effortlessly and repeatedly,
but we don’t know how to make it happen. I write to explain to the reader that SVB requires
the absence of aversive stimulation. Only those who speak English understand
English and “only those who share the values of a behavior-analytic culture
will agree.” Only those who engage in SVB will agree with SVB. It is sufficient to know that
SVB is possible.
Unlike
these authors I think that “The effectiveness criterion” does “take into
consideration the preliminary role that basic beliefs or assumptions play in
controlling the use of effectiveness as means of assessing the validity of an
explanation.” These authors reason from a NVB point of view, while Skinner
reasons from a SVB point of view. They are silly to accuse Skinner of being
“dogmatic.” Since they are stuck in the
same NVB boat as Hayes, they are looking for something to base their argument
on. All they can do is yank the reader around with more writings from others who
disagree with Skinner. Yet, to carve out their own niche, they state “Nevertheless, Hayes
(1993) is not here taking into account that, for Skinnerian behaviorism,
analytic objectives or prior goals are not prediction and control as such, but
a set of specific beliefs about its subject matter: behavior.” Since this is
true, Hayes was wrong. In my analysis,
Skinner has more SVB than the majority of behaviorists and the authors of this
paper have more SVB than Hayes.
In
both SVB and NVB we are dealing with “a set of specific beliefs about” how we talk. If this writing was a real conversation, mentioning objectives which can be found “throughout Skinner’s work” would involve increased rates of SVB. Although he didn’t know the SVB/NVB
distinction, Skinner’s references to verbal behavior were “clearly defined,
explicitly addressed, and frequently recognized as arbitrary (perhaps the only
exception to this is the reference to the “natural lines of fracture along
which behavior and environment actually break”) [Skinner, 1935/1961b, p. 347]).