April
27, 2016
Written
by Maximus Peperkamp, M.S. Verbal Engineer
Dear Reader,
In
“Human Behavior as Language: Some Thoughts on Wittgenstein” (2006) Ribes-Iñesta explains Wittgenstein’s three “language
games.” He refers to them as “the dimensions of language, language as a
medium, as an instrument, and as a form of life.” Ribes-Iñesta admits that “they
are difficult to separate from each other both in Wittgenstein’s conception as
well as in the phenomenon of language as a social daily practice.” This is
especially true when we are writing about spoken communication. Our tendency to
separate and analyze things is unfortunately more a part of our written
language than of our spoken language. We have not been very successful in
giving an analytic account of spoken communication while we speak.
While
we speak unknowingly many negative emotions keep being triggered which prevented
us from being rational about our speech. In other words, we keep having Noxious
Verbal Behavior (NVB) as we don’t know how to achieve and maintain Sound Verbal
Behavior (SVB), rational spoken communication which is made possible by the
absence of negative emotions. This issue has never been properly addressed. We
are not truly rational as long as our negative emotions are elicited by the way
in which we speak. Our thinking only functions properly with the continuation
of positive emotions.
Coincidentally,
there are also three reasons why we don’t attain SVB. Each of these reasons
changes the way in which we sound. 1) The sound of our voice changes when we
are overly fixated on the verbal. When what we say is more important than how
we say it, we disconnect from our body, the instrument of sound. Our
disembodied way of talking, NVB, just sounds horrible. NVB speakers don’t pay
attention to what they experience within their own skin while they speak. The
speaker-as-own-listener is only stimulated during SVB, but not during NVB. 2) Our
voice also voice changes from sounding good to sounding terrible when the
environment changes. Instead of feeling safe we suddenly feel threatened. We
are outward oriented, when we have to
be on guard, defend ourselves or flee. We produce a very different kind of voice
when we enjoy ourselves and each other or when we fight with each other, try to
dominate each other or try to escape from each other. We either sound scary or we
sound scared, but in both cases we don’t sound at ease. 3) The third reason our
voice changes is because we engage in some
kind of struggle. Any
kind of struggle makes us sound unpleasant. When in NVB we struggle to get each
other’s attention we sound awful. We sound nasty when we argue about who is
right. We sound dreadful when our private speech is at odds with and
disconnected from our public speech. We
sound repulsive each time we don’t listen to ourselves while we speak. We sound
hideous when our speaking and our listening behaviors are not occurring at the
same rate.
Three
reasons change our voice: (1) fixation on the verbal, (2) outward orientation,
and (3) struggle for attention, must be explored and verified while we speak. The
NVB speaker, who separates him or herself from the listener, sounds unspeakable
to the listener as the listener is not allowed to speak. The NVB speaker, whose
voice is experienced by the listener as an aversive stimulus, always elicits
the listener’s counter-control, which also sounds argumentative. The struggle
for dominance sounds repulsive to those who know SVB. We produce nervous sounds
and we engage in NVB when we worry about whether people perceive us how we want
to be perceived. In our struggle for approval, acceptance, respect and
validation, we just sound ghastly, nasty and grisly. Every time we demand each
other’s attention, we sound upset, grim and angry. The more we disconnect from
each other, the more we disconnect from ourselves, the more horrifying we sound.
Wittgenstein’s
language games don’t refer to the three reasons why our voice changes. Like me, Wittgenstein was intensely frustrated
by how people talked with him. His writing signifies his frustration with the
results of his spoken communication. My writing, on the other hand, is a
function of the many positive results which I have experienced due to my
discovery of SVB. I write about, am certain of and have faith in the joy, beauty
and intelligence of genuine human interaction. When Wittgenstein writes
“So you are saying that human
agreement decides what is true and what is false? It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they
agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinion but in form of
life (1953, p. 241)”, he refers to both SVB as well as NVB. In SVB there is
more than the agreement in the language we use. In SVB there is nonverbal
agreement which makes verbal agreement possible, but in NVB there is no
nonverbal agreement and therefore verbal agreement is superficial and
short-lived. Wittgenstein and
Ribes-Iñesta are fixated on the verbal,
which gives rise to NVB. Ribes-Iñesta makes
no reference to how he sounds. “Language
as a medium becomes apparent in the form of the words (spoken and written)
through which conventional practice operates.” Wittgenstein too ignores his
voice. “To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand
a language means to master a technique” (1953). SVB is not a technique! We
don’t say that walking or eating or sitting is a technique. SVB is a skill
which will only be learned if someone is teaching it to us. The only person who
can teach SVB to others is someone who is not interested in technique.
Wittgenstein
and Ribes-Iñesta agree that “To consider language as an instrument entails
thinking about its functions,” but don’t say a word about the function of the
sound of their voice while they speak. I disagree with Ribes-Iñesta, who writes
“Meanings are the outcome of the use of words in social contexts.” I
would say meanings are the outcome of how we sound when we use words in social
contexts. Certainly, “meanings are” more than the “words being used.” During SVB and NVB we may use the same
words, but they have different meanings. Most of what is said is not found in our
words, but in how we say it, in how we sound. Wittgenstein links meaning of
language with private speech, with how he talks with himself. “When I
think in language, there aren’t “meanings” going through my mind in addition to
the verbal expressions; the language is itself the vehicle of thought (1953, p.
329).” Such covert self-talk is clearly a function of SVB public speech. Here Wittgenstein
unknowingly explains that his private speech is function of public speech. He
must have previously engaged in SVB. The nuance of such thought couldn’t ever arise
from NVB, which is based on the speaker’s mistaken conviction that he or she is
causing his or her own behavior.
Wittgenstein
writes “Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments. Now
perhaps one thinks that it can make no great difference which concepts
we employ. As, after all, it is possible to do physics in feet and inches as
well as in meters and centimeters; the difference is merely one of convenience.
But even this is not true if, for instance, calculations in some system of
measurement demand more time and trouble than it is possible for us to give
them (1953, p. 569).” SVB and NVB can
and perhaps should be considered as different
systems of measurement. SVB takes more time and requires more attention than
NVB. NVB is mechanical and repetitive as it refers to the establishment and
maintenance of hierarchical differences, whereas SVB involves heterarchical,
creative and spontaneous relationships. Only SVB we can talk and make sense of functional
relationships as in NVB we are simply too stressed, anxious, angry, frustrated
and unconscious to pay close attention to the particular circumstances in which
we employ certain concepts. Ribes-Iñesta states “Communication is a phenomenon
taking place as a special function of language and not as an equivalent to
language.” He could have gone into other
variables than language of which communication is function, but since he only
writes about language, he overlooks how what
we say is function of how we sound.
We sound different when we are in a rush or have time. While Wittgenstein asserts
“words have meaning only in the stream of life (1980, p. 687),” he is oblivious
of the SVB/NVB distinction.
“The
stream of life” can be explained as positive or negative emotions. The words we
speak which are accompanied by the former or the latter are part of SVB or NVB.
These two response classes can be found in every language. Wittgenstein is
right, but he doesn’t go deep enough by stating that “what we do in our
language game always rests on a tacit presupposition. (1953, IV, p. 170).”
The SVB speaker talks with the
listener, who can also become the speaker, but the NVB speaker talks at the listener, who is only allowed to
become a speaker when the first speaker gives him or her permission to
speak. Even if the listener is allowed to speak in NVB, he or she is expected
to speak in such a way that the status quo will be reinforced. In SVB, on the
other hand, talking creates an entirely new order, which couldn’t be established
as long as NVB prevailed. SVB can only occur in an environment which makes us
feel at ease and aware, while NVB always involves aversive environments in
which the communicators are dull, repetitive and stagnant.
I
wonder what made Wittgenstein decide to use the term “language games?” The way
in which adults deal with language has nothing to do with a game. Are we
playing games when we dominate, exploit, manipulate, alienate and coerce each
other? In SVB we are not playing any games anymore. None of the assumptions listed
by Ribes-Iñesta refer to the sound of the speaker’s voice. Since Wittgenstein
didn’t mention it, Ribes-Iñesta doesn’t mention it either. If Wittgenstein
would have mentioned it Ribes-Iñesta would probably have written about it too. However,
Ribes-Iñesta only tries to make clear what Wittgenstein had already written, “Psychology
has not recognized that language, although ever-present in human behavior and
its context, does not constitute a psychological phenomenon.” Wittgenstein is generally
not very well-understood as he was advocating and early behavioral account of
language. Even among today’s behaviorists there is contention about Verbal
Behavior (1957), which Skinner considered to be his most important book. Verbal
behavior without the SVB/NVB
distinction has remained incomplete and inaccessible. The only way in which
behaviorists are going to know about this distinction is when they are going to
talk about it with each other.
Behaviorists,
like Ribes-Iñesta, who are obviously more into talking than into writing, have
written many papers which point into the direction of more talking. Increased
talking has not occurred and could not occur as long as NVB wasn’t stopped.
Increased talking will only occur when we know how to stimulate and maintain
SVB. To recognize, as Skinner has also stated, that language is NOT
a psychological phenomenon, more SVB talking is needed.
