April
22, 2016
Written
by Maximus Peperkamp, M.S. Verbal Engineer
Dear Reader,
In
“Human Behavior as Language: Some Thoughts on Wittgenstein” (2006) Emilio
Ribes-Iñesta writes “Given the characteristics of Wittgenstein’s writings, I
will quote him extensively in order not to distort his ideas.” He is trying
stay as true to what Wittgenstein was actually saying as he could. Ribes-Iñesta
carefully explains why he gives Wittgenstein so much room, so much context. “This
expositive method has nothing to do with a doctrinary or exegetic attitude
regarding Wittgenstein’s claims; it is only a safe method to transcribe his
arguments properly.” Although Ribes-Iñesta does a great job transcribing
Wittgenstein’s arguments, what was not mentioned was that Wittgenstein was attempting
to describe Sound Verbal Behavior (SVB).
According
to Malcolm, who wrote “A Memior” about Wittgenstein (2001), “his ideas were
generally misunderstood and distorted even by those who professed to be his
disciples. He doubted he would be better understood in the future. He once said
he felt as though he was writing for people who would think in a different way,
breathe a different air of life, from that of present-day men.” I think Wittgenstein
was referring to SVB. Ribes-Iñesta makes use of Wittgenstein’s
writings to illustrate important things about behaviorism. SVB will once be
understood as having that function as well.
Even
if we have behaviorism it is still very much needed that we reflect on “improper
interpretations of language expressions disconnected from the action and
context in which they are used.” Ribes-Iñesta, who recognizes that Wittgenstein
was essentially advocating a behavioral account, writes “Wittgenstein was
concerned with the improper interpretations of language expressions
disconnected from the action and context in which they are used. His questions
and arguments were directed to show the confusions and distortions engendered
by the improper interpretation of utterances and expressions. A correct analysis
of expressions in context should allow us to “dissolve” the problems thus
generated.” I don’t want the reader to miss out on what Ribes-Iñesta has
written about Wittgenstein either because it shows how necessary it is that we
are finally getting to the distinction between SVB and Noxious Verbal Behavior
(NVB) without which even behaviorists keep being stuck with “improper
interpretations of language expression” which are “disconnected from the action
and the context in which they are used.”
Wittgenstein’s
“language games” were his attempt to provide a functional account. The “psychological phenomena such as “seeing,”
“remembering,” or “knowing” have several meanings” depending of what they are a
function. As we explore, while we talk, the SVB/NVB distinction, it becomes clear
why it has taken us such a long time to recognize that our own sound is needed to
contextualize our language. “Wittgenstein’s remarks on psychological
phenomena are not a psychological theory or a theory about language. They
support arguments and reflections about the social nature of human life and how
it is inevitably impregnated with language.” SVB enlightens us about the “the
social nature of human life”, but NVB prevents us from acknowledging this
“social nature.” Much of what we have called “social” is hierarchical.
The
SVB/NVB distinction reveals that expression of our “social nature” requires equality
and SVB, but is made impossible by NVB which maintains inequality and hierarchical
relationships. As long as we don’t know how to continue SVB, our social nature
will not blossom and mental health issues will emerge. SVB has the potential to
dissolve all our social problems. It may sound unbelievable and idealistic, but
this is a fact which can and must be verified. Social problems are called
social problems, because of NVB. In SVB we don’t call it that. NVB
communicators are anti-social and hierarchical. Inequality will either dissolve
by how we talk or will be maintained by it.
“In
order to avoid confusions and to dissolve false problems” SVB is absolutely “indispensable.”
Malcolm (1971) “characterizes this approach to philosophy by saying that
“Philosophical work of the right sort merely unties knots in our understanding.
The result is not a theory but simply no knots! ”SVB is the way of talking
which “merely unties knots in our understanding.” I rather call it a social approach
than a philosophical approach. What we have called philosophy is called
philosophy as we didn’t know how to talk about it.
We have never recognized that
only in NVB things are difficult to talk about. Our inability to talk and
engage in SVB has given rise to all sort constructs, which have no validity at
all. Skinner correctly argued against all these unnecessary theories. “Human behavior cannot be understood if we
separate language and social practice. Language without social practice and
social practice without language are senseless.” Here Ribes-Iñesta gives us a
perfect characterization of NVB. All the so-called social practices, which
involve the establishment and the maintenance of hierarchical, unequal
relationships, were based on NVB. SVB, on the other hand, transcends this hierarchy
and makes it look primitive and limiting. The logic of language is neither grounded on fictitious
hierarchical relationships nor on the “fictitious universal logic of a rational
or formal syntax or grammar.”
