April 22, 2016

April 22, 2016

Written by Maximus Peperkamp, M.S. Verbal Engineer

Dear Reader,

In “Human Behavior as Language: Some Thoughts on Wittgenstein” (2006) Emilio Ribes-Iñesta writes “Given the characteristics of Wittgenstein’s writings, I will quote him extensively in order not to distort his ideas.” He is trying stay as true to what Wittgenstein was actually saying as he could. Ribes-Iñesta carefully explains why he gives Wittgenstein so much room, so much context. “This expositive method has nothing to do with a doctrinary or exegetic attitude regarding Wittgenstein’s claims; it is only a safe method to transcribe his arguments properly.” Although Ribes-Iñesta does a great job transcribing Wittgenstein’s arguments, what was not mentioned was that Wittgenstein was attempting to describe Sound Verbal Behavior (SVB).

According to Malcolm, who wrote “A Memior” about Wittgenstein (2001), “his ideas were generally misunderstood and distorted even by those who professed to be his disciples. He doubted he would be better understood in the future. He once said he felt as though he was writing for people who would think in a different way, breathe a different air of life, from that of present-day men.” I think Wittgenstein was referring to SVB. Ribes-Iñesta makes use of Wittgenstein’s writings to illustrate important things about behaviorism.  SVB will once be understood as having that function as well.

Even if we have behaviorism it is still very much needed that we reflect on “improper interpretations of language expressions disconnected from the action and context in which they are used.” Ribes-Iñesta, who recognizes that Wittgenstein was essentially advocating a behavioral account, writes “Wittgenstein was concerned with the improper interpretations of language expressions disconnected from the action and context in which they are used. His questions and arguments were directed to show the confusions and distortions engendered by the improper interpretation of utterances and expressions. A correct analysis of expressions in context should allow us to “dissolve” the problems thus generated.” I don’t want the reader to miss out on what Ribes-Iñesta has written about Wittgenstein either because it shows how necessary it is that we are finally getting to the distinction between SVB and Noxious Verbal Behavior (NVB) without which even behaviorists keep being stuck with “improper interpretations of language expression” which are “disconnected from the action and the context in which they are used.”

Wittgenstein’s “language games” were his attempt to provide a functional account.  The “psychological phenomena such as “seeing,” “remembering,” or “knowing” have several meanings” depending of what they are a function. As we explore, while we talk, the SVB/NVB distinction, it becomes clear why it has taken us such a long time to recognize that our own sound is needed to contextualize our language. “Wittgenstein’s remarks on psychological phenomena are not a psychological theory or a theory about language. They support arguments and reflections about the social nature of human life and how it is inevitably impregnated with language.” SVB enlightens us about the “the social nature of human life”, but NVB prevents us from acknowledging this “social nature.” Much of what we have called “social” is hierarchical.

The SVB/NVB distinction reveals that expression of our “social nature” requires equality and SVB, but is made impossible by NVB which maintains inequality and hierarchical relationships. As long as we don’t know how to continue SVB, our social nature will not blossom and mental health issues will emerge. SVB has the potential to dissolve all our social problems. It may sound unbelievable and idealistic, but this is a fact which can and must be verified. Social problems are called social problems, because of NVB. In SVB we don’t call it that. NVB communicators are anti-social and hierarchical. Inequality will either dissolve by how we talk or will be maintained by it.

“In order to avoid confusions and to dissolve false problems” SVB is absolutely “indispensable.” Malcolm (1971) “characterizes this approach to philosophy by saying that “Philosophical work of the right sort merely unties knots in our understanding. The result is not a theory but simply no knots! ”SVB is the way of talking which “merely unties knots in our understanding.” I rather call it a social approach than a philosophical approach. What we have called philosophy is called philosophy as we didn’t know how to talk about it. 

We have never recognized that only in NVB things are difficult to talk about. Our inability to talk and engage in SVB has given rise to all sort constructs, which have no validity at all. Skinner correctly argued against all these unnecessary theories.  “Human behavior cannot be understood if we separate language and social practice. Language without social practice and social practice without language are senseless.” Here Ribes-Iñesta gives us a perfect characterization of NVB. All the so-called social practices, which involve the establishment and the maintenance of hierarchical, unequal relationships, were based on NVB. SVB, on the other hand, transcends this hierarchy and makes it look primitive and limiting.  The logic of language is neither grounded on fictitious hierarchical relationships nor on the “fictitious universal logic of a rational or formal syntax or grammar.”