April
24, 2016
Written
by Maximus Peperkamp, M.S. Verbal Engineer
Dear Reader,
In
“Human Behavior as Language: Some Thoughts on Wittgenstein” (2006) Ribes-Iñesta writes “The term “language” is
the only one that “refers” to itself, and it is a term included in and used in
language. This may explain the particular elusiveness of the term and its
extended meanings.” I disagree with him. He doesn’t explain why “the term
“language” and its extended meanings” continues to be elusive. The reason that
“language” has remained elusive is because we don’t realize the extent to which
our written words take our attention away from our spoken words. Developmentally, our written words are a function of our spoken words. Our attempts to explain our
spoken words with our written words would be more successful, if we first attempted
to explain our spoken words with
our spoken words. As this would have required a different way of talking, we choose to write
about talking more than to talk about talking, because were unsuccessful in
changing our way of talking.
Our
writings have taken us further and further away from our talking and our
technology has increased rather than decreased this process. Another way of
describing this process is that our Noxious Verbal Behavior (NVB), our negative
way of talking, couldn’t address what can only be addressed by our Sound Verbal
Behavior (SVB), our positive way of talking. There is nothing elusive about
SVB, either we have it or we don’t. Once we have it, we are surprised that
there is nothing to explain. Since we can directly experience what SVB is,
there is no need to first understand or explain it.
Once
we have SVB, we can understand and explain it without a problem. As we haven’t had SVB often enough we lose
touch with our experience of it and are unable to accurately describe it. As a
consequence, we keep having NVB without even realizing it. We often think that we
have SVB when in fact we are having NVB. Moreover, our history with SVB is so
limited that we even think that it is impossible to have ongoing SVB, conversation
in which our positive emotions are reinforced and can continue. Stated
differently, the multiple meanings of the term “language” is NOT the problem. Our
way of talking is the problem and we
can no longer cover this up with our writings.
In
SVB we are able to talk about our talking. We experience an interaction in which
our understanding continues to increase as we explore our interaction while we speak. As previously stated, both
Wittgenstein and Skinner were on the path they were on because of their high
rates of SVB. “Wittgenstein (1953) conceived language games as conventions
forming part of social practices and relations: “Here the term ‘language game’
is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language
is part of an activity, or of a form of life (p. 23)” (Italics were not by me, but by Wittgenstein).
He emphasizes the word speaking to
remind himself as well as the reader that what he has written is really about
spoken communication. Although Wittgenstein wrote about a very different kind
of speaking than most other people, he didn’t and couldn't specify that he was writing about
Sound Verbal Behavior (SVB).
Considering
Wittgenstein’s reclusive life-style, it seems quite evident that most of his
writing was his attempt to bring out his private speech into his public speech.
Thus, it was Wittgenstein’s isolation which gave rise to his writing. “We’re
used to a particular classification of things. With language, or languages, it
has become second nature to us (1980, p. 678).”
Like many other thinkers, he seemed to have stumbled on SVB by ‘talking
to himself’ through his writing. However, it is very clear from his writings
that he didn’t find much SVB in his spoken conversations. Wittgenstein often
complains that people don’t understand him. However, understanding was never
really the problem. His analysis was in fact about SVB, but the blunt manner in which
most people talk is NVB. Ribes-Iñesta writes “When people speak, their speech is not the overt manifestation of an abstract
grammar that rules and regulates what can be said or not, or how to say
things” (italics added by me). What a person says doesn’t depend on what has
been written, but it definitely depends on who we are talking with, as we are,
after all, each other’s environment. In SVB and NVB we are saying very different
things.
What
can be said in SVB cannot be said in NVB. The development of our verbal
behavior was made possible by our SVB, but was always impaired or made impossible
by our NVB. Once we engage in SVB, we realize how often we were involved in
NVB. It is therefore always retrospectively that we recognize NVB as
NVB. Ribes-Iñesta comes as close as he can to ‘saying’ the same thing, as he
writes: “As I have remarked previously (Ribes, 1991), language as actual
behavior has no grammar. Grammar, as an ideal structure of language, is an a
posteriori abstraction of products and vestiges of the actual behavior of speaking
and writing.” Note that he mentions speaking first. It is also interesting that
the definition of a posteriori is
relating
to what can be known by observation, that is, through listing experience,
rather than through an understanding of how certain things work. This relates
to how SVB works: experience of sound is primary and our understanding of
language is secondary. Wittgenstein writes “Grammar
does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfill its purpose,
in order to have such-and-such an effect on human beings. It only describes and
in no way explains the use of signs (1953, p. 496).” I totally agree, but like
to add that how we sound tells “us how language must be constructed
in order to fulfill its purpose, in order to have such-and-such an effect on
human beings.”
SVB
speakers have a different effect on listeners than NVB speakers. Also, the SVB
speaker’s “use of signs” is different from the NVB speaker. Although SVB and
NVB speakers may use the same words, these words have different meanings
because of how they sound. Moreover, the SVB speaker uses different signs than
the NVB speaker. SVB speakers vocalize safety
signs with the sound of their voice, while NVB speakers vocalize signs which indicate
threat. Thus, the SVB/NVB distinction explains our use
of vocal signs.
Ribes-Iñesta
comes closer to the SVB/NVB distinction as Wittgenstein as he writes “In
fact, grammar is an invention of the language games being played by individuals
according to their practical conventions. Grammar is a description—sometimes
inaccurate and delayed—of the uses of language as activities articulated
within a form of life.” Since he doesn’t know about the SVB/NVB
distinction, Ribes-Iñesta is unable to pinpoint that the use of NVB language
only makes sense within the NVB community and that the use of SVB language is only articulated within the SVB community.
The
SVB community is a different “form of life” than the NVB community.
Wittgenstein might have been thinking out loud as he wrote “The rules of
grammar may be called “arbitrary,” if that is to mean that the aim of
the grammar is nothing but that of the language. If someone says “If our language
had not this grammar, it could not express these facts,” it should be asked
what “could” means here (1953, p. 497)”. However, it should be stated emphatically:
it is due to how we sound that we cannot express certain facts. The question:
what “could” means here (?) shows that
Wittgenstein was fixating on the verbal,
which is a characteristic of NVB. Ribes-Iñesta’s
explanation, on the other hand, leads to the verbal community.
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