April 28, 2016

April 28, 2016

Written by Maximus Peperkamp, M.S. Verbal Engineer

Dear Reader,

In “Human Behavior as Language: Some Thoughts on Wittgenstein” (2006)   Ribes-Iñesta explains “The instrumental nature of language is also related to the fitness of the tools to the outcomes.” Unfortunately, Ribes-Iñesta doesn’t consider “the instrumental nature of language” in its most literal musical sense.  If he had done that, he would have to acknowledge that, regardless of what instrument we are talking about, regardless of the topography, musical instruments produce sounds. The previous statement would have a new meaning if we considered the sound of language. Then the relationship between “the fitness of the tools to the outcomes” informs us that certain sounds determine certain outcomes. This becomes clear with the distinction between Sound Verbal Behavior (SVB) and Noxious Verbal Behavior (NVB).

In SVB we achieve equality in our relationships, but in NVB we establish and maintain unequal, hierarchical relationships in which the speaker separates from the listener. Humans, like other species, affect each other with sound.  

Wittgenstein writes “Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments. Now perhaps one thinks that it can make no great difference which concepts we employ. As, after all, it is possible to do physics in feet and inches as well as in meters and centimeters; the difference is merely one of convenience. But even this is not true if, for instance, calculations in some system of measurement demand more time and trouble than it is possible for us to give them (1953, p. 569).” Unknowingly, Wittgenstein confirms with this statement the difference between SVB and NVB. Although it seems as if SVB and NVB “demand more time and trouble than it is possible for us to give them”, once we discriminate them we will be spared from an enormous amount of time and trouble. In SVB we have choices which we simply aren’t aware of in NVB. NVB has limited us in multiple ways, but primarily it has impaired our relationships. Based on the equality between the speaker and the listener SVB will enhance our relationship and make our lives better. We can use our voice as an instrument and thus make music while we speak.

Ribes-Iñesta incorrectly thinks that “Wittgenstein views language as being always immersed in practical action.” If that were really true, Wittgenstein would have emphasized speaking. As Wittgenstein, like most behaviorists, felt frustrated by his attempts to talk about language, he dedicated most of his attention to writing about it. Once we are able to discriminate between SVB and NVB, we realize that writing about language is NOT a “practical action” at all. When we finally engage in SVB conversation about language, we acknowledge we have been distracted from our actual conversation by everything that was written. As most of our language happens at the covert level, as thinking, as private speech, which is a function of public speech, it got more and more separated from public speech. This is a very important, but totally unexplored reason why we are inclined to give homuncular power to inner psychological processes, to what Skinner has called mentalism.

Wittgenstein’s writing is an attempt to bring out his private speech into public speech, but writing cannot produce speaking. Ribes-Iñesta states that “All human behavior is linguistic, even when the actions involved do not encompass “linguistic” morphologies.” I don’t think the question “whether or not” language “is morphologically linguistic” is as important as the SVB/NVB distinction. Moreover, as it deals with how we sound while we speak, the SVB/NVB distinction emphasizes rather than downplays morphologies. Although behaviorism has been most successful as a treatment for autism, in helping those who don’t produce language like everyone else, this hasn’t led to what should be called the restoration of the importance of the sound of our voice while we speak. The importance of how we sound is lost in NVB. We find our voice only during SVB. It is due to NVB that we have ignored, ever since we have begun to read and write, how we sound while we speak.

Those who unknowingly mainly engage in NVB cannot be considered fully verbal from this new perspective. Ribes-Iñesta’s responds to Wittgenstein’s writing with writing. He writes that “Seeing, feeling, learning, and thinking, just to name some of the fundamental psychological phenomena described in and by ordinary language, are linguistic phenomena, not some sort of internal talking, listening, reading, or writing.” Would he have written this if he had talked with Wittgenstein? The question how someone speaks with us has long-lasting effects on how we talk, listen, read and write. Ribes-Iñesta’s reasoning about Wittgenstein’s “language games” is based on reading and writing and thus basically excludes the importance of speaking and listening.